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Introduction
As is discussed elsewhere in this Bulletïn issue, the
degree of state involvement in economic decision-
making in Taiwan and South Korea has been
understated by adherents of the economic doctrines of
laisser faire. This debate about the extent of state
intervention has focused mainly on the industrial
sector. The proponents of laisser faire have been
unable to garner much support for their interpretations
of the Taiwanese and Korean experiences from the
policies practised towards agriculture. For the high
degree of state intervention in the agricultural
economy has been well documented. This is especially
true of Taiwan, where relatively fast agricultural
growth since the 1940s is widely attributed to activist
public policy [eg Johnston and Clark 19821. Lee [19711
in particular has detailed how in the early stages of
Taiwan's rapid post-war growth, the state extracted
from agriculture a large volume of material resources
(finance, food, labour and exports) to support
industrialisation. The main mechanisms used were:
obligatory rice deliveries from all paddy farmers at
low prices; monopoly control over fertiliser supply,
sugar cane processing and foreign trade in the major
agricultural commodities; and a quasi monopoly of
the foodgrain trade. Monopoly state control of foreign
trade in foodgrains and of agricultural input supply,
and widespread official coercion (in the l970s) to
influence farmers' production practices have been
documented for Korea [Aqua 1974; Ban et al 1980;
Brandt 1977; Reed 1979; Wade 1982, 19831.
Is agriculture in some way a special case? Do the extent
and consequences of substantial state intervention in
agriculture have little or no bearing on the debates
about the actual, feasible and desirable degrees of
public regulation of the economy as a whole? This
article argues that this is not so. It indicates three
conclusions about the relationship of the state to the
The author is gratefut to Robert Wade and Gordon White for
comments on an earlier draft of the paper. For reasons of space, no
references or details are given when making points about changes in
economic structure.
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agricultural economy in Taiwan and Korea since the
early 1950s:
That in the early stages of industrialisation state
action which considerably 'distorted' price ratios
affecting agriculture played an even more important
positive role in promoting agricultural growth than is
implied by examining the transfer of resources from
agriculture to industry. This intervention also helped
to provide an appropriate supply of the 'right' kind of
industrial labour, and to maintain the political
quiescence of the rural population.
That even in countries like Taiwan and South
Korea where senior bureaucrats and politicians
making economic decisions are to a relatively high
degree insulated from direct political pressures to
alleviate the material conditions of large population
groups [HoTheinz and Calder 1982], changes in
economic structure generate strong political pressures
for the state to intervene in the economy in new ways.
That market forces alone often cannot achieve
the kinds of economic restructuring which is required
to adjust to, and facilitate further, rapid economic
growth.
These three conclusions have two broad implications
for the debate about the relative roles of public action
and free markets in the economy generally. One is that
state action in apparent violation of market principles
can play a very positive role in promoting economic
growth. The other is that political and economic
imperatives may make high levels of state involvement
in economic decision-making practically unavoidable.
Agriculture and Industrial Growth in the
1950s and 1960s
After the land reforms of the late 1940s and early l950s
[Thorbecke 1979:172-6; Ban et al 1980:ch 10] the
agrarian systems of Taiwan and South Korea were
remarkably similar. Their main features were: the
predominance of small family farms averaging about
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one hectare; the dearth of large farmers, landlords and
landless agricultural labourers; the dominance in the
cropping pattern of rice, which was grown by most
farmers; a high degree of dependence of agricultural
production on current inputs supplied from within the
family farm, notably labour and organic fertiliser; the
limited role of fixed capital other than land and
publicly owned and managed gravity flow irrigation
facilities; and the prime reliance of farm families on
agriculture as a source of income, with non-
agriculture providing about 20 per cent.2
The structure of the agricultural economy made
farmers relatively easy prey for sets of policies which
subordinated agriculture to the goals of industriali-
sation and strengthening the state in relation to its
external enemies and potential internal opponents. In
the 1950s and 1960s agriculture contributed to these
goals in three ways.
In the first place, policies to depress agriculture's
terms of trade extracted significant surpluses of a)
cheap food which lowered industrial wages and thus
production costs; b) financial resources; and e), in the
Taiwanese case, agricultural exports, to fuel industrial-
isation. As is mentioned above, in Taiwan this
objective required high levels of direct state control of
foreign trade, sugar cane processing, foodgrain
marketing and agricultural input supply and output
procurement. Korea by contrast was and remains in
substantial food deficit. The primary mechanism for
the exploitation of agriculture was to deny it the
protection awarded industry and to import large
quantities of foodgrains, often on concessional terms.
Compared to Taiwan, state agencies did not intervene
very directly in the domestic agricultural economy,
and indeed to a large extent ignored it [Kim and Jhoo
1982; Ban et al 1980].
In the second place, adverse terms of trade for
agriculture ensured a continual flow of new applicants
to the industrial labour force. Since these migrants
came largely from farm families - rather than
landless households - they maintained rights and
connections in the rural areas which inhibited the
formation of proletarian consciousness in the urban
and industrial environment. The demographic char-
acteristics of the applicants for industrial jobs add
weight to this point. Married males tended to stay on
the farm. Industrial employers were able to recruit
younger males and females. The latter in particular
A few significant differences might he rioted; after ihe repair of the
damage and dislocations caused by Second World War, the Korean
War, and the descent of the Chinese Nationalists upon Taiwan,
Taiwan re-emerged with an export surplus of rtce and sugar while
Korea, having been a rice exporter under the Japanese. became and
remains a substantial cereal Importer; there was moie inequality
within the Taiwanese farm sector than iii Korea: rural
communications and infrastructure were much heiter in Taiwan
than in Korea.
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tended to see themselves only as temporary members
of the industrial workforce, and were correspondingly
particularly unlikely to organise politically. Labour
turnover was often high, and this proved especially
convenient for employers during industrial recessions,
when the small farm sector served as a temporary
refuge for those who would otherwise have expected
non-agricultural jobs. Equally, rapid labour turnover
and the inability of the labour force to assert claims to
permanent employment made it especially easy for
industrialists to respond quickly to changes in market
opportunities and switch product lines.
In the third place, a rural economy comprising mainly
small family farmers found it especially difficult to
organise politically to oppose the anti-agriculture bias
of economic policy. This not only made it easier to
pursue this policy, but helped to prevent the
emergence of political conflict and instability which
would have frightened domestic and foreign industrial
investors.
In the Korean case rural political instability was less of
a threat in the l950s and 1960s because land reform
and the events surrounding the Korean war had
largely ameliorated or eliminated the rural radicalism,
especially anti-landlordism, which had been so
prominent in the late 1940s.
In Taiwan the threat was more real, especially because
of the danger of the fusion of farmers' occupational
grievances with the resentments of the mainly
agricultural Taiwanese population against Mainlander
Nationalist rule. An important aspect of the response
of the ruling Kuomintang, both in rural and urban
areas, was what might be termed 'political gap-filling':
the creation, under state and ultimately party
sponsorship, and 'guidance', of monopoly organi-
sations to fill, in a formal sense, every possible need.
This was closely allied with a) the attempt, largely
successful in a formal sense at least, to make the KMT
itself into a mass party and to induct into it those who
emerged as leaders in any sphere of activity; b) the
close monitoring of religious institutions and sects,
which cannot be formally incorporated into civic
associations, and which, because of the strong ties of
religion with locality and community in Taiwan, have
a potential political dimension; and e) the establish-
ment. albeit originally very reluctantly and under
considerable direct and indirect American pressure, of
a facade of extreme democracy: endless elections
(Tatwanese probably vote more often than almost any
other people in the world) to territorial government at
all levels (village, township, county, province, China)
and to 'civic associations', notably, in rural areas,
Farmers Associations and Irrigation Associations. In
the sense that most of these elections are hotly
contested and the results not always predictable.
'facade' might be too strong a term. In the senses that
the KMT in various ways limits the range of
competitors and that the elected bodies have little
authority or resources, the epithet is fully justified
[dough 1978: ch 2; Jacobs 1980; Winckler l981a,b].
From the present point of view the most significant
'managed' institutions in Taiwan are the Farmers
Associations, which have been widely praised as
models of democratic, participation and efficient rural
institutions [Kwoh 1964; Stavis 1974]. While accepting
that some of them have a relatively good record as
agricultural service agencies, this author would
emphasise:3 the tight political control exercised over
the Farmers Associations; the extent to which they
have been used to serve state rather than farmer
interests; and the way in which they are in aggregate
kept fragmented and relatively powerless. Nearly all
authority and resources are concentrated at township
level, and the superior (county, provincial) levels are
relatively unimportant. The near absence of large and
influential farmers has helped in maintaining a high
degree of state control over the Farmers Associations.4
'New Deals' for Agriculture
In both Taiwan and South Korea the late l960s saw
the inception of policies which were ultimately to lead
to a fundamental shift in the relationship between
agriculture and the rest of the economy. Following the
path beaten by Japan and other industrial nations,
agriculture is now a subsidised and protected sector in
both countries. This 'new deal' did not take exactly the
same form in both countries. In particular, while in
Taiwan it was associated with a gradual decline in the
degree of direct state involvement in the agricultural
economy [Moore 1983], in Korea, because the 'new
deal' coincided with the large scale introduction of
high yielding rice varieties, it generated, in the short
term, an increase in the use of administrative pressure
aimed at influencing farmers' production practices.5
But in both countries the 'new deals' essentially took
the form of attempts to shift terms of trade in favour of
farmers, and were associated with increasingly overt
political conflict over policy towards agriculture. As
we shall see below, both processes were the outcome of
major structural changes in the economy as a whole.
In Taiwan the 'new deal' began with the announcement
in late 1969 of the Accelerated Rural Development
Programme (ARDP) [Yu 1978]. Originally, a time
bound programme focused in large part of big public
This interpretation is based on the authors fieldwork and de Lasson
[1976].
The general point abour the greater ability of large farmers to
challenge public policy is made by, for example, Bates [1981:126-7].
This increase in administrative pressures is documented by Brandt
{l977] Reed [1979]; Wade [1982, 1983]. However, as described in
Moore 11984] this pressure was relaxed around the end of the 1970s.
rural investments in infrastructure, credit and
marketing, the ARDP has been extended indefinitely.
It was also to become the symbolic vehicle for a set of
changes in pricing and revenue policy which were to
amount to a shift from industrial to agricultural bias:
reductions in fertiliser prices initiated in 1970;
reductions in rural taxes initiated in 1971; the
abolition of the rice-fertiliser barter scheme in 1972;
and, in response to further concern about the slow rate
of growth of rice output in the early l970s, a near
doubling of the official purchase price of rice in 1974.
Further increases in the official price of rice meant that
by 1977 it had become a support price. Rather than
delivering obligatory quotas of rice to government,
farmers are privileged to sell to the state, at prices
higher than those in the free market, a quota
equivalent on average to about a quarter of
production. Farmers Associations, whose main
function had been to perform cheaply on behalf of the
state the procurement, distribution and storage
functions associated with public fertiliser and rice
operations, are now allowed more generous margins
on these activities and considerable autonomy to
make and use substantial profits from a thriving credit
business.
The 'new deal' for Korean farmers began in 1968 with
the first of a series of increases in the government
procurement prices of rice which were within a few
years to take the domestic producer price well above
world market prices. Allied to the introduction and
rapid spread of high yielding rice varieties after 1970,
growing subsidies on fertiliser and a substantial shift
of government investment to rural areas, this change
in price policy resulted in a very rapid increase in rice
production and in real farm incomes in the first half of
the l970s. And these improvements in the farm
economy took place in the context of the Saemaul
Movement for rural development, launched in late
1969 and the centrepiece of government policy and
action in the early and mid 1970s [Moore 1984].
The Reasons for 'New Deals'
The immediate reasons for these 'new deals' in
agricultural policy were both economic and political
and, because of the similarities in economic and
agrarian structure and economic performance, similar
in both countries. The first was a marked slowing
down of the rate of growth of agricultural output after
1964 in Korea and after 1965 - and again in the early
1970s - in Taiwan. Although basically a surplus rice
producer, Taiwan, given continued population
growth and the concern for basic food self-sufficiency
stimulated by its precarious international position,
could not afford at that stage to take a relaxed attitude
to declining agricultural growth rates. Only at the end
of the 1970s was its rice surplus to become a financial
embarrassment to the government.
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The second reason for the 'new deals' was an
increasing awareness of the political consequences of
the fact that from the mid 1960s the gap between
average farm and average non-farm incomes began to
widen alarmingly in both countries. In Korea this was
manifested in the growth of shanty towns around
Seoul. For the strong geographical concentration of
industrial growth around Seoul and Pusan meant that,
unlike in Taiwan, where industrial jobs were available
in the countryside [Ho 1982], in Korea ex-farmers
tended to vote with their feet.
In both countries the political leadership made major
efforts to identify themselves with the rural
population. In Taiwan the Accelerated Rural
Development Programme was the brainchild of
Chiang Ching-Kuo, the son of President Chiang Kai-
Shek. Chiang Ching-Kuo, then Prime Minister and
now President, identified himself with both rural
people generally and with a group of politicians, many
of them Taiwanese rather than Mainlanders, who
claimed to represent the Taiwanese and farming
interests. Unlike in earlier years, by 1970 the
promotion of farming interests was seen as a viable
route to political power. In Korea President Park,
himself from a rural background and from his ascent
A Tainan fariner p/aug/Is his field viii, a motor-driven rotovator in preparation jr planting rice.
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to power in 1961 more responsive to rural issues than
the previous leaders, made the originally and basically
rural-oriented Saemaul Movement the ideological
centre-piece of his rule in the 1970s. The need for such
a shift in policy and ideology was illustrated in the
1971 Presidential elections, when Korean farmers
departed from the post-1953 practice of rather
passively voting for established incumbents and 45 per
cent of all votes were cast against Park [Hahn
l975:88J.
A third reason for the 'new deal', specific to Korea,
was the decreasiPg willingness of American govern-
ments to feed urban Korea with cheap PL 480
foodgrains.
The ultimate causes behind these three sets of
pressures for the 'new deals' were the economic
successes of the 1960s. In both countries the fast
growth of industrial productivity lay behind the
growing farm-non-farm income diferences. Farm
production was becoming more dependent on
purchased current and fixed capital, and thus more
vulnerable to the disincentive effects of adverse farm-
non-farm terms of trade. And the emergence in both
countries of a relative labour shortage in the mid-
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l960s made it increasingly easy and attractive for
farmers to shift family labour into non-agricultural
jobs. Changes in economic structure had increased the
costs to the economy of pursuing further the existing
policy towards agriculture. Small farms could no
longer be held 'captive' and be obliged to produce
despite poor returns to farming [Moore 19841.
Economic growth and structural change were also, in
a less visible fashion, changing the political equation
behind the pricing policies practised in the 1950s.
In the first place, agricultural producers were
becoming more specialised and marketing increased
proportions of their output of the main crop, rice. The
adverse effect on their incomes of the policies which
had generated adverse terms of trade was becoming
more visible (for specialist producers) and greater (for
rice producers). Farmers were more likely to voice
grievances against economic policy.
In the second place, decreasingly poor food
purchasers were spending declining proportions of
their incomes on food in general and basic foodgrains
in particular. 'Cheap rice' was a decreasingly effective
rallying point and single focus of demands, implicit or
explicit, of both food consumers and industrial
employers interested in cheap wage goods.6 This was
especially true in somewhat wealthier Taiwan, where
foodgrains feature less visibly in consumer expenditure.
Korea began, and continues, to subsidise both grain
producers and consumers from public funds. Taiwan
continued to give cheap rice rations to public and
military employees but abandoned this for all except
the military in 1982, with little apparent opposition. In
both countries the 'new deals' for agricultural
producers were followed by real increases in consumer
rice prices.
In the third place, the declining place of agriculture in
national income lowered the potential cost to the
government and to the economy of policies to support
agriculture. Taiwan, with only eight per cent of its
gross domestic product arising from agriculture in
1980, was several years ahead of Korea, where
agriculture still accounted for 20 per cent ofGDP. lt is
fully consistent with the political and economic
mechanisms posited above that during the 1970s the
Taiwanese Government shifted the terms of trade
more strongly in favour of farmers than did the
Koreans.
Contemporary Conflicts over Economic Policy
Conflicts of interest between food producer and
consumer and between agriculture and the guardians
of the public purse and of the national economic
For a description of this general process see Bates [1983: t24J.
interest did not disappear. Indeed, the latter were
exacerbated by the 'new deals'. From the early l970s
the Korean Government found itself committed to
very heavy subsidies on fertiliser and on the difference
between the prices it paid to farmers for rice and barley
and the lower prices at which it sold them to
consumers. The Taiwanese Government was in a less
difficult situation. For it did not subsidise fertiliser
and only around the end of the l970s did support
prices for rice become a financial embarrassment, as
officially procured rice accumulated in store and had
to be exported at a loss. The financial cost to
government of supporting agriculture is far lower than
in Korea, although it threatens to increase now that
per capita rice consumption has begun to fall rapidly,
and rice prices to decline because of market forces.
Government has now begun to pay farmers for not
growing rice on paddy land.
In Taiwan as much as in Korea, concerns about the
financial cost of supporting agriculture have been
supplemented by concerns about the economic cost to
the nation of protecting agriculture against competing
imports. Both countries, but especially Korea, are
high cost producers of grains and of some other
agricultural products, including livestock products.
The labour intensive small farm sector is becoming an
increasing economic embarrassment. Once functional
to industrial growth, it has now become a hindrance.
The example of Japan, with its very heavily protected
small farm sector, is a warning to both countries of the
dangers of not tackling the problem seriously.
There are two main ways of attempting to deal with
the agricultural problem. One is to reduce the level of
agricultural protection and, making necessary allowance
for the security of national food supplies, depend even
more on imported grains, especially feedgrains for the
fast-growing livestock sectors. Yet there are strong
political arguments against such a policy. The farm-
non-farm income differentials, which narrowed
during the 'new deals', have begun increasing again in
the late l970s in both countries. For this and other
reasons the political pressures for continuing to
protect agriculture are strong in both countries.
In Taiwan the identification of farming with
Taiwanese interests, although far less valid than
before, is still factor to consider. And in recent years
there has been a considerable 'opening up' of the
higher levels of Party and government to Taiwanese
politicians. They cannot easily abandon their pro-
agriculture stances. Within the Taiwanese public
bureaucracy itself agricultural protection has powerful
advocates in the form of the agricultural agencies,
notably the Council for Agricultural Planning and
Development - formerly the Joint Sino-American
Commission for Rural Reconstruction. Cynics may
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argue that the agricultural bureaucrats are motivated
mainly by fear that their jobs and careers are
threatened by the declining importance of agriculture.
Yet the power of the agricultural bureaucracy and the
Taiwanese politicians associated with it is real. In late
1983 the two managed to achieve a legislative change
which will tend to increase the forces for agricultural
protection.
In Korea pressures for agricultural protection are not
institutionalised even to the limited degree that they
are in Taiwan. The parastatal agencies serving
agriculture, the National Agricultural Cooperative
Federation and the new National Livestock Co-
operative Federation, remain entirely state run.
Attempts to turn the Saemaul Movement into
something like a mass rural party to support the
regime have failed, and the Movement is now virtually
moribund at grass-roots levels [Moore 1984]. The
main spokesmen for farmers' interests are the radical
Catholic and Christian Farmers movements, which
stand in complete opposition to the present regime.
Although they have only a limited mass base, these
movements do articulate a disillusion and resentment
against government policies which is widely held in
rural Korea now that the terms of trade and the
weather appear to have turned against farmers since
the late 1970s, the Saemaul Movement has lost its elan,
and government has generally ceased to give farmers
the priority and attention they commanded in the
early l970s. In recent years Korean farmers, unlike
those in Taiwan, have faced a decline in the real
returns to the labour they put into farming. Also
unlike Taiwan, non-farm employment has not spread
widely into rural areas. This currently accounts for
about three quarters of farm family income in Taiwan,
but only a third in Korea [Moore 1984].
The Korean Ministry of Agriculture appears well
aware of the strength of rural dissent, and is itself a
devout if not omnipotent advocate of protection for
agriculture. Imports of some agricultural products,
especially livestock products, have been liberalised in
recent years [Kim and Jo0 1982]. But the issue of
agricultural protection is still very bitterly contested.
The outcome may depend in part on the attitude taken
by the large corporations which have moved into the
livestock sector in a big way in recent years, and have
begun, as in Taiwan, to make big inroads into the
small farm livestock sector [Moore 1984]. Dependent
almost entirely on feedgrain imports, and themselves
often (and in Korea, increasingly) feedgrain importers,
these corporations would seem to have an objective
interest in liberal grain import policies and protection
against imports of livestock products.
Agricultural Restructuring
As the livestock example helps to illustrate, the major
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restructuring of agriculture which has taken place in
Taiwan and Korea has been through the market
mechanisms rather than through state action. But
neither government has been able to avoid exploring
the second main option to solve the agricultural
problem: to promote directly increases in the size of
farms in both operational and ownership terms.
Attempts to do this date back to the 1960s in Taiwan
and the early 1970s in Korea, with official
encouragement and subsidies for cooperative farming
and cooperative labour groups and farm machinery
pools. The local manufacture of farm machinery has
been encouraged, and retail prices subsidised. In fact
little success has been attained, and the 'new deals' had
an adverse effect by slowing down the rate of
departure from the land. Average farm size has
increased only slowly, although the rate now shows
signs of speeding up. Korean governments have been
prevented from taking the necessary legislative action
- especially legalising tenancy, which remains
formally illegal although very widespread [Moore
1984] - party through fear that raising the land issue
will allow the Catholic and Christian farmers to make
political capital out of such issues as suburban land
speculation. The land law question has however been
deemed urgent for more than a decade.
The Taiwanese Government has not been similarly
constrained, and has introduced a series of measures
- including special lines of credit and encouragement
for farmers to reverse tradition and leave land only to
a single heir - aimed at increasing the size of the land
ownership unit. Such measures, along with the
payment of subsidies to farmers not to grow rice on
paddy land, and increasing official pressures on
Irrigation Associations to 'encourage' farmers not to
grow rice, illustrate that the state has felt unable to
stand back and allow market forces to achieve
agricultural restructuring within a reasonable time
scale. Such 'market induced' restructuring is especially
unlikely in Taiwan because of the widespread
dispersal of industry into rural areas and the
consequent high speculative value of land which might
at some stage be used for industrial or housing
purposes. Average farm size has tended to increase
even less slowly than in Korea. One set of market
forces is working directly against restructuring. Korea
does not face this problem to the same degree. But
because of the dearth of rural non-agricultural jobs the
government has felt obliged to introduce a major
programme to move industry into rural areas.
Conclusion
This article is not intended to eulogise state regulation
of the agricultural economy. Many government
policies and mechanisms - notably perhaps the
Farmers' Associations in Taiwan - have been much
less effective than is claimed. It is also the market
rather than public action which has been the main
cauSe of structural change in Taiwanese and Korean
agriculture. The limited success of official measures to
increase farm size has been mentioned. The main
effective mechanism has probably been tenancy
arrangements which have been, and in Korea remain,
formally illegal. In Taiwan failure to legalise new
tenancy arrangements until 1983, a product of
attachment to institutionalised myths about the
liberating role of the Nationalists' land reforms of the
late l940s and early 1950s, have often been cited by
farmers as an obstcle to greater recourse to leasing of
land. It is mainly the market which is responsible for
the big shift of Taiwanese and Korean agriculture
away from cereals to horticultural and livestock
products [Moore 1983]. This was in part the result of
policies which depressed cereal prices [Kuo 1983:ch 3],
but was contrary to the intentions and declared policy
of government. The ever-promotion in Korea of new
rice varieties, which proved very susceptible to disease
and poor weather in the later 1970s [Moore 1984], is
the clearest example of misguided public actions in the
agricultural sphere.
Yet it would be doctrinaire in the extreme to cite such
examples of ineffective or inefficient state action as
evidence to support the case of minimal state
intervention. There is every reason to believe that the
policies to 'squeeze' agriculture in the 1950s and 1960s
did make an important contribution to fast industrial
growth. It is difficult to believe that agricultural
production would have grown much faster in the long
term if it had not been the 'victim' of these policies.
The long term agricultural production growth rate of
3.7 per cent per year which has been achieved in both
countries since the mid-1950s is itself impressive in the
global context. It owes a great deal to the rapid growth
of consumer demand for horticultural and livestock
products which industrial growth engendered. With-
out this new consumer demand for high value, labour
intensive, land saving products, Taiwanese and
Korean farmers would have been 'trapped' at lower
income levels into dependence on relatively land
intensive cereal production in a situation where land is
extremely scarce.
Perhaps even more importantly, the case material here
illustrates the impracticability of the doctrine of
minimal state intervention in the economy. Firstly, the
need to restructure the economy to cope with the
problems engendered by economic growth forces the
state to take a hand. Secondly and perhaps more
importantly, changes in economic structure oblige the
state to intervene in the economy in new ways in order
to maintain the political support or acquiescence of
the population. The ultimate weakness of extreme
doctrines of laisser faire is that they abstract totally
from politics. Political order, with all the implications
it has for investor confidence in 'open' capitalist
economies, must be an objective of a viable economic
policy.
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